Reply to a Reply

By Ron Dennis, Ed.D.

David Langstroth's reply to my Primary Control article makes it clear that I need not only to respond to points raised by him but also to expand my own treatment of theory, not, I see in retrospect, adequately addressed in my paper. For convenience both in composition and cross-reference, I follow the general order of DL's Reply, and take this opportunity to thank him and others for their contributions to the discussion.

DL begins by claiming that FMA coined the term primary control to describe the practice not only that he had employed to solve his own vocal problems but also that he had taught his pupils "from the very beginning." I point out that this claim can only be based on FMA's own testimony in US, Chap. 1 (and presumably orally), which is precisely the testimony at issue relative to primary control. Thus, there is no independent evidence, in FMA's writings or elsewhere, for this claim. Certainly in the early writings through MSI, there is no assertion of  "a certain relationship between head, neck, torso and limbs." I and my trainee have read aloud completely through the 1,000-odd pages of Jeroen Staring's two-volume The First 43 Years of the Life of F. Matthias Alexander, which, one might say, goes rather thoroughly over the ground up to 1912. Via a painstaking comparison of the writings of FMA, Scanes Spicer, and others, Staring argues convincingly, if not conclusively, that the posture/movement aspect of FMA's teaching, in contrast to the respiratory, became dominant only after 1910. Staring also shows, and conclusively, that FMA's concepts of inhibition, direction, sensory appreciation, and even aspects of the manual technique, were all anticipated in mid- to late-19th-century therapeutic literature. This is said not at all to detract from FMA's work, which, unlike the others, has indeed survived for us to embrace. But it is abundantly clear that any meaningful discussion of the Technique's origins is now impossible without assimilating either Staring's work or  all of its source material. (Self-published by the author in only 50 copies, this work is currently out-of-print. However, it should be required reading for all Alexander teachers and trainees, and I hope that demand will engender a new printing.)

DL's next point concerns primary control as a neural mechanism; he says that FMA never described primary control thus. That is true, and neither did I say that he did, but that is not really the point. The point is that others have so described or characterized it, and continue to do so, the "master reflex" notion advanced by Patrick MacDonald, a very influential teacher, being perhaps the most obvious instance. DL implies that I am worried about the absence of a neural mechanism. For the record, I am not. Clearly there are neural mechanisms, those studies cited by DL being welcome recent additions to a long train of investigation. What I am worried about is not only the AT's being represented by a simplistic model of movement control in particular and human behavior in general, but also the effect upon teaching practice of such a model. FMA's error was less in introducing the term than in doing so in such a vague manner as to lend itself so readily to the confusion and misunderstanding acknowledged even by DL. I must say I find rather odd the suggestion that those of contrary opinions on primary control "ought simply to be corrected." After all, we're talking about strong-minded and intelligent Alexander folk here, not naughty puppies.  

DL's account of the "Langstroth Technique" brings us to the issue of theory, seen by him as a diversion in my paper. That was hardly my intent, but, as indicated above, I have only belatedly seen my error. For the problem was in saying too little too vaguely about theory, rather like FMA's treatment of primary control. In my paper I was thinking of  "theory" implicitly in several senses while using it explicitly in only two. A device of Korzybski's General Semantics, in which the different senses of a word are identified by numerical subscripts, is an elegant way to bring clarity to the matter. In common  usage, then, at least the following meanings of  "theory" can be distinguished (the order of subscripting is arbitrary):

Theory₁, formal predictive theory, as in my paper
Theory₂, formal descriptive theory, the same
Theory₃, informal predictive theory, as in hunches, intuitions (my theory about the race tomorrow)
Theory₄, informal descriptive theory, as in explanations  (his theory on  inhibition)
Theory₅, formal speculative theory, as in Plato's theory of the good.
Theory₆, informal speculative theory, as in opinions (her theory regarding the case)

Now we are in a position to lay to rest this question about theory and practice in the AT in general and in FMA's working out of it in particular.

First of all, the title of my paper should now read "Primary Control and the Crisis in Alexander Technique Theory_2,4." My chief concern in this side of our work is how we conceive and thus describe it, both formally and informally. I maintain that our language in this usage should be as precise and relevant as the use of our hands, and have given reasons why I think "primary control" is not the best language for this purpose. On the other hand, we all make use of theory₃ in the daily use of ourselves,  including our teaching, as did FMA in working out the Technique: " 'Is it not fair, then,' I asked him [his doctor],  'to conclude that it was something I was doing that evening in using my voice that was the cause of the trouble [italics his]?'" (The fact that I cite FMA from a source previously called into question means only that I believe--as in the Bible-- some things more than others.) What is practice after all but the increasing refinement of an ongoing "hunch and trial" process? So no, I have not "construed the relationship between theory and practice in the Alexander Technique completely back to front," as DL asserts, although my error was serious enough in treating the term "theory" simultaneously in both a broader and a more specific sense than did, for example, FMA, who only meant theory₅ when he spoke of "mere theory" and probably theory₂ in "the practice and theory of my technique."

I note in passing that, in using the term "academic" in reference to aspects of my paper, DL seems (theory₆) to be intimating something beyond the mere fact of my status as a Degreed Person. He  seems to resent, or at least take exception to, my daring to talk seriously about theoretical matters relative to a technique so eminently and obviously practical as ours (yes, mine too). He as much as says that such matters of theory are, in effect, self-evident. However, judging from the volume of thoughtful response to my paper, this is clearly not the case. What is the case is that coy locutions such as "academic preoccupation with the theory of theory" and "carefully constructed arguments of academics" do not serve either communication or collegiality.  

The question of context regarding FMA's comment to Jones about there not being a "primary control as such" is fair enough, and I confess to not having read the entire letter. But, as the unequivocalness of some utterances makes less pressing the usual burden of contextual reference, my confidence that FMA's letter actually existed and that the material was quoted as written (Note 20 of my paper) seemed to me at the time sufficient to the scholarly task. Nonetheless, the point is well taken. I have, however, reviewed Jones' School and Society article, which I reprinted in "The Frank Pierce Jones Memorial Issue" of The Alexandrian in 1982. The sentences to which FMA was probably responding most likely were these:

1. "The primary control of the mechanism, which consists in the preservation of a certain relativity between the head and the neck, they [Magnus and his school] described as the  tonic neck reflexes.'"
2. "When he [FMA] had succeeded [in inhibiting the impulse to pull his head down], a new use (the tonic neck reflexes of Magnus) took its place; and this proved to be the mechanism conditioning all other reflexes and thus controlling psycho-physical activity."

Thus I agree with DL that FMA probably "was refuting the idea that the primary control was some sort of anatomical entity," but (again), that's not the main point. The main point is that others (including Jones₁₉₄₃ we now see) did (and do) so conceive and propagate this notion of an anatomically more-or-less discrete primary control. Perhaps the foregoing will help answer DL's indignant question about who started this "persistent fallacy" anyway (I do not mean to imply that it was only Jones).

It remains to respond to DL's brief but potent closing comments regarding dissent from primary control orthodoxy (the p.c. of pc?) on the one hand, and authenticity as an Alexander teacher on the other. To quote him, "Do Alexander Teachers who claim to disagree with the 'concept of the primary control' still work with the head and neck? Or do they just work in specific ways with specific [sic] to try to solve specific problems?" Of course I can, and will, speak only for myself , but first there is an assumption of DL's to be exposed. This assumption is that (1) working with the head and neck and (2) working with other parts of the anatomy are mutually exclusive. I do not believe this to be so, but rather, as is often the case in such apparently "either-or" matters, a question of emphasis and priority. Thus, I find it not only desirable but also eminently possible to give a focal direction such as to aim the knees forward in walking, in the general context of lengthening the stature and all else that "neck free" implies. I have helped the possessors of several pairs of ailing knees in this way, so DL's example is nicely apposite. The whole matter is very much like acquiring skill on a musical instrument; one is always playing the whole instrument all the time, yet at different phases different aspects of the process are selected for particular attention--rhythm, tone quality, intonation, finger technique, phrasing--all the while the total performance being guided by its primary control, in this instance,  necessarily to be sure by the mechanisms of hearing but sufficiently only by conscious musical listening. No analogy is perfect, but this one is very close, and, I trust, obvious enough not to require further pursuit.

So, as long as the "control" in primary control is understood first and foremost as a verb (coordinative process) and not as a noun (neural mechanism), I have no conceptual problem with it, the objections voiced in my paper notwithstanding. A better term, however, and hence a better conception (or vice-versa) would be "primary coordination," or even "primary relationship" (if emphasizing the postural over the motional aspect of use), both of which I employ regularly. Truth be told, "primary response" would add to the postural and motional the necessary ethicaldimension of the concept of the use of the self, but that must be another story for another time.

© 2000 by Ronald J. Dennis